Without question, social media has transformed how many artists interact with the public, how they brand themselves, and the very nature of how they disperse their work. But where social media opens avenues for reaching new, arguably larger audiences, in turn it forces stricter boundaries on them. Not only are works confined to the rectangle of a phone screen, they are more abstractly restrained to “Community Guidelines” or “Terms of Service” within the social media platforms. Instagram’s “Community Guidelines” for example bans nudity, and states “always follow the law.” When social media platform subscriptions overpower museum visitation and become the main ...
[caption id="attachment_6226" align="alignnone" width="185"] Siegelaub's "Artist's Reserved Rights..." Agreement.[/caption] Asks Isaac Kaplan. I'm quoted in this article on artists' rights, the art market, contracts and moral rights. Is authorship something that can be revoked at will? Under what authority can an artist disavow one of his or her works? How do artists exert control over their work long after it ceases to be their property? Check it out!
Readers might remember that earlier this year the NY Times sued a publisher who used thumbnail reproductions of the newspaper’s front pages in a book that attacks the Times war coverage. A few of us mentioned that this was a ridiculous and petty lawsuit, one which read as vindictive rather than protective (the book is critical of how the NY Times glamorizes war for the sake of sales). I also said that this was a clear case of fair use. Well, they just settled. The details of the settlement are not public, but a court filing shows the deal was dismissed with ...
[caption id="attachment_8926" align="alignnone" width="300"] Pottery by Nampeyo. Image courtesy of the Peabody Museum, Harvard University.[/caption] A New Mexico district court judge ruled against Harvard University on this question. But to us, well, it depends on what was copied.
By Caroline Keegan Taryn Simon’s exhibition “Paperwork and the Will of Capital” presented itself as a group of archival style photo and sculpture works that documented agreement meetings in international juridical history; it embodied the intersection of art and law. For the series, Simon’s recreated bouquets presented the instances world leaders were brokering deals. She selected countries that were part of the Bretton Woods Conference. She then photographed the bouquets, and paired them with text summarizing the historical context and archiving the species of plant. The text was written as an elegy, which in frame with the bouquet read as a ...
Remember this case, Johnny Anderson vs. City of Hermosa Beach, concerning a city ordinance that banned tattoo parlors within the City of Hermosa Beach? The crux of the City’s argument was that a tattoo artist was merely a “tool,” a “medium” of sorts, for the expression of a client’s chosen design.
Well, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, showing a rare glimpse of reason, has struck down the anti-tattoo parlor law from the City of Hermosa Beach. The Ninth Circuit stated that the US Constitution protects “collaborative creative processes” like newspaper reporting, which is assigned and reviewed by editors, or tattooing. The Court added, “Tattooing is a process like writing words down or drawing a picture, except that it is performed on a person’s skin.”
The lawyer for the tattoo artist, Robert Moest, told the LA Times that the ruling “will overturn similar ordinances in many small cities in Los Angeles County. Local governments could still pass zoning restrictions and charge license fees to fund health inspections of tattoo parlors, which generally operate safely and have a financial incentive to do so.”
The three Ninth Circuit judges presiding over this appeal were John T. Noonan, Richard R. Clifton and Jay S. Bybee. More from the LA Times here. You can also view the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous ruling here.
The College Art Association (“CAA”), some artists, and a few other organizations have filed a “friend of the court” brief with the US Supreme Court asking the nine justices to hear a case concerning a removed artwork and the city of San Marcos, Texas. (pdf version of brief here.)
CAA argues that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made a grave error by declaring that the advertising art “installation” in front of a business establishment was not “great art.” (Background here.) However, as I read the Fifth Circuit’s decision, they’re not saying that at all. What the Fifth Circuit is saying–rightly–is that when visual objects contain both speech and non-speech factors, intermediate scrutiny will apply and therefore grant the state the right to limit that speech. The Fifth Circuit also argues that when it is a mixture of expressive and non-expressive speech, the tedious task of deciding which it is is a case-by-case problem.
In the case of the City of San Marcos (Kleinman v. City of San Marcos), the Fifth Circuit rightly asserts:
Irrespective of the intentions of its creators or Planet K’s owner, the car-planter is a utilitarian device, an advertisement, and ultimately a “junked vehicle.” These qualities objectively dominate any expressive component of its exterior painting.
Finding that the car-planter was a utilitarian device with incidental expressive content, the Fifth Circuit looked to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning when it faced a similar quandary. The Eighth Circuit,
… confronted … with a wrecked auto that was displayed streetside to remind the public how the owner’s son had been killed, had no difficulty finding that the auto’s removal under a junked-vehicle ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny. Davis v. Norman, 555 F.2d 189 (8th Cir.1977). When the “expressive” component of an object, considered objectively in light of its function and utility, is at best secondary, the public display of the object is conduct subject to reasonable state regulation. We therefore pretermit “recourse to principles of aesthetics.”
In other words, the question is not whether the “planter” is art or great art. The Supreme Court has already decided that. The question is whether the “planter,” which has both speech and non-speech factors, and its location, can be regulated by government. It appears that it can. I sincerely doubt the US Supreme Court will grant certiorari (to hear the case). Good luck!
After reading so many accounts of artists being stifled by copyright and trademark law, it’s a breath of fresh air to see an artist that is not only using a corporate asset in her artwork, but more so that she’s also working with the corporation to create artwork.
Not only does artist Margaux Lange use “dismembered” Barbie doll parts to create jewelry, she’s even designing an exclusive line just for Mattel. She’s not alone, so is Phillippe Starck and Jonathan Adler. This is not to say that all artists should only create with the permission or consent of another artist or corporate giant (there is after all fair use). This is only to say that if given a choice between defending a trademark and copyright lawsuit, and working with Mattel, it would take an idiot to choose the first (see Shepard Fairey).
More on Lange and Mattel here.
A federal judge in Manhattan ruled on Tuesday that a documentary filmmaker must submit to depositions in a case involving Chevron, writing in a strongly worded opinion that the oil company’s original request to see the filmmaker’s raw documentary footage was “no fishing expedition.”
Background on story here.
An amateur artist who designed the original logo used by the Baltimore Ravens won a partial victory Thursday when a federal appeals court ruled the commercial use of game and highlight films from the Ravens’ first three seasons violates his copyright. The Ravens could appeal the Fourth Circuit’s majority decision to the full appeals court or the U.S. Supreme Court.
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